Abstract: This contribution purports to critically examine the ways in which modern international legal scholarship has come to grips with the question of bridging the 'democratic participation gap' in the context of defining and prioritising global public goods. It begins by asserting that core tenets of legal positivism, such as State sovereignty and consent, are deeply undemocratic, or that, at a minimum, they are capable of operating in a deeply undemocratic way, thereby casting doubt on whether classic international law can be seen as the solution to the problem of democratic participation. Against this background, the article continues by exploring two alternative theoretical frameworks for bridging the 'participation gap'. The global administrative law project is examined and rejected as its main focus on accountability, rather than democracy, implies that it lacks ambition when it comes to the question of broadening decision-making processes. The focus turns next to global constitutionalism. It is argued that, in reality, this version of constitutionalism does not really offer any new analytical and normative insights; traditional legal thinking is anything but unfamiliar with the conceptual distinction between direct and indirect participation. The article concludes by canvassing some remarks on a common mindset of the discipline: the discipline's knee-jerk response to the challenge of defining global public goods illustrates the unease felt by international lawyers to deal with questions of global governance without transferring them into the realm of law.
A. INTRODUCTION
Although the concept of global public goods, initially rooted in economic theory, has entered into the policy discourse of a number of important international organisations over the past two decades, international legal scholars are relative latecomers to the debate. Only recently have international lawyers begun to seriously grapple with the challenge of identifying and defining common goods that transcend national boundaries. Current theorising has focused on the so-called 'democratic participation gap', namely on the idea that one of the main challenges of extrapolating the concept to the global level is the under-representation of many potentially affected stakeholders (such as groups of States, civil society actors and even individuals) in the decision-making processes surrounding the definition and provision of these goods. In this vein, it has been asserted that global public goods cannot be defined in a democratic and legal vacuum and, thus, different accounts of how the discipline ought to contribute to the * Eva Kassoti (PhD), Senior Lecturer in Law, The Hague University of Applied Sciences. E.Kassoti@hhs.nl. integration of democratic and participatory principles in the definition of global public goods have been offered.
In this light, this contribution purports to critically examine the ways in which modern international legal scholarship has come to grips with the question of bridging the 'democratic participation gap' in the context of defining and prioritising global public goods and global commons. The article begins by asserting that core tenets of legal positivism, such as State sovereignty and consent, are deeply undemocratic, or that, at a minimum, they are capable of operating in a deeply undemocratic way, thereby casting doubt on whether classic international law can be seen as the solution to the problem of democratic participation. Against this background, the article continues by exploring two alternative theoretical frameworks for bridging the 'participation gap'. The global administrative law project is examined and rejected as its main focus on accountability, rather than democracy, implies that it lacks ambition when it comes to the question of broadening decision-making processes.
The article turns next to global constitutionalism. The project's principal emphasis on global values, such as democracy and inclusiveness, seemingly makes it the perfect heuristic device for integrating democratic ideals in the definition of global public goods. However, it is argued that recourse to global constitutionalism is not without problems. This school of thought acknowledges that the indirect involvement of non-State actors in decision-making can enhance the legitimacy of global governance, and thus, it advocates in favour of broadening, structuring and streamlining the role of non-governmental organisations ('NGOs') in international decision-making processes. More particularly, Anne Peters argues in favour of retaining the distinction between legal subjects and social actors that may indirectly influence decision-making processes since this distinction is crucial in maintaining stability and predictability in international relations. It is doubtful whether Peters' version of constitutionalism -that has recently gained traction as it stays closer to mainstream legal thinking -can offer additional insights on how international law could become more conducive to filling the 'participation gap'. The article argues that, in reality, this version of constitutionalism does not really offer any new analytical and normative insights; traditional legal thinking is anything but unfamiliar with the conceptual distinction between direct and indirect participation.
The article ultimately raises the question of the usefulness of addressing the challenge of defining global public goods from the vantage point of international law. It is argued that, presently, international law and international legal scholarship are of limited assistance in redressing the participation gap in the definition of global public goods. The article concludes by canvassing some remarks on a common mindset of the discipline: the discipline's knee-jerk response to the challenge of defining global public goods illustrates the unease felt by international lawyers in dealing with questions of global governance without transferring them into the realm of law. The article stresses that, as international legal scholars, we should be more open to the limitations of our own discipline and accept that we can grapple with new phenomena without necessarily apprehending them as legal phenomena.
B. BACKGROUND TO THE CONCEPT OF GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS
The concept of public goods is rooted in economic theory and denotes goods that are non-rival and non-excludable, in the sense that everyone can use them without diminishing their availability to others (non-rivalry) and that no one can be practically excluded from using them (non-excludability). 1 An oft-cited example of a public good is a lighthouse; everyone can benefit from its light without diminishing its availability to others and no one can be prevented from using it. Until recently the concept of public goods remained within the frame of reference of the nation-State; the relevant debate assigned State institutions an important role in financing and producing public goods and the provision of such goods was seen as the main reason for the existence of the State. 2 However, over the past two decades, the concept of public goods has assumed a prominent role in global policy discourse largely as a result of the efforts of the United Nations Development Program ('UNDP') Office of Development which published three books on the topic of 'global public goods' ('GPGs') in 1999, 3 have recognised the growing importance of GPGs. The concept has gained traction in the international arena largely because it can be used as a legitimising instrument for the everexpanding role of international institutions. As Bodansky explains: 'For international organizations, global public goods … provide a response to the growing questions that emerged in the 1990s about their legitimacy.' 19 Recasting a global policy challenge in terms of 'global goods' provides a powerful argument in favour of increased co-operation and regulation. 20 For instance, recasting the problem of climate change in terms of reduction of greenhouse gas emissions accentuates the need for collective action at the international level.
As the argument goes, just as the State is considered crucial in providing public goods at the national level, international governance is crucial for the provision of global public goods. 21 International legal scholars are relative newcomers to the debate; only recently have international lawyers begun to seriously grapple with the challenges posed by common goods that transcend national boundaries. International law can be (and has been) seen both as 8 ibid. 9 International Task Force on Global Public Goods (n 6) x. 10 Scott Barrett, 'Montreal versus Kyoto: International Cooperation and the Global Environment' in Kaul, Grunberg and Stern (n 1) 192. 11 I Serageldin, 'Cultural Heritage as Public Good: Economic Analysis Applied to Historic Cities' in Kaul, Grunberg and Stern (n 1) 240. 12 Lincoln C Chen, Tim G Evans and Richard A Cash, 'Health as a Global Public Good' in Kaul, Grunberg and Stern (n 1) 284. 13 Joseph E Stiglitz, 'Knowledge as a Global Public Good' in Kaul, Grunberg and Stern (n 1) 308. 14 Ruben P Mendez, 'Peace as a Global Public Good' in Kaul, Grunberg and Stern (n 1) 382. 15 Petersmann 25 have cast doubt on the ability of international law to tackle the challenge of GPGs. Authors belonging to this school of thought claim that the consent-based structure of international law (both in terms of incurring obligations and in terms of enforcement) prevents it from effectively countering the free-riding and collective action problems often associated with the provision of GPGs. 26 This line of critique echoes the concern raised in non-legal scholarship over the hurdles of the 'Westphalian decision-making processes'. The economist, Nordhaus, has stressed that:
[T]he Westphalian system leads to severe problems for global public goods. The requirement for unanimity is in reality a recipe for inaction … To the extent that global public goods may become more important in the decades ahead, one of our major challenges is to devise mechanisms that overcome the bias toward the status quo and the voluntary nature of current international law in life-threatening issues. To someone who is an outsider to international law, the Westphalian system seems an increasingly dangerous vestige of a different world. 27 Similarly, the International Task Force on Global Public Goods identified State sovereignty as one of the main problems hindering the effective provision of GPGs. 28 However, the picture is not as bleak as it may seem at first glance. Although international law lacks strong enforcement mechanisms -thereby being of limited assistance in addressing issues of free-riding -the contributions by Schaffer and Bodansky show that GPGs entail different problem-types 29 producing different types of these goods. 30 For aggregate effort GPGs (namely GPGs that can only be produced through the collective action of multiple States) 31 international law could provide different fora for negotiations in the form of international institutions as well as a learning process for the evaluation of the costs and benefits of producing these goods. 32 For weakest link GPGs (which involve a holdout problem in the sense that the benefit of the GPG is provided only if all States participate) 33 international law could provide solutions either through co-operation (eg providing assistance through international institutions to 'weak'
States to produce the GPG), or through coercion (eg imposing economic or other types of sanctions in cases of States that are unwilling to co-operate in the provision of GPGs). 34 On the other hand, in the case of single best effort GPGs (in the sense of goods that do not require for their solution the aggregate effort of a group but rather depend on the single best effort of an individual actor) 35 international law and international institutions can play a role in decisions over implementation by constraining unilateral action. 36 At the same time, it has been pointed out that most of the existing scholarship focuses on issues related to the provision of GPGs, whereas the question of which goods to provide in the first place has largely remained at the margins of scholarly attention. 37 It needs to be noted that defining what amounts to a 'global public good' is never neutral, but rather it constitutes a matter of policy choice. 38 As the International Task on Global Public Goods has conceded: 'A critical reality of global public goods is that they are contested; states have different interests, values and preferences, even when they share long-term goals.' 39 Climate engineering provides a good example; some argue that it should be conceptualised as a global public good as it could have positive effects on slowing climate change, whereas others consider it as dangerous and immoral. 40 41 Cogolati, Hamid and Vanstappen (n 37) 5. attention to the little explored link between GPGs, democracy and international law and have highlighted the need to engage more deeply with 'the role that international law could play in guaranteeing a democratic decision-making process on GPGs.' 42 The call for expanding the research agenda on GPGs to include considerations of democracy is substantiated, inter alia, with reference to the UNDP study on GPGs. 43 The study underscores that one of the main weaknesses of the current governance architecture hindering the effective provision of GPGs is the so-called 'participation gap', ie the exclusion of those affected by decisions on GPGs from the decision-making processes regarding their definition. 44 The Commission also refers to the 'participation gap' as one of the main deficits of the existing policy-making mechanisms at the international level. According to the Commission: 'Agreements on which GPGs should be given priority are political choices in which the maximum involvement of all those affected is crucial.' 45 In this light, the remainder of the article explores whether, and if so to what extent, international law can help reduce the democratic deficit in the definition of GPGs. For this purpose, the next section begins by making some preliminary points regarding the relationship between democracy and international law.
C. DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Democracy both as a constitutional principle and as a political process is a contentious concept that has undergone significant changes throughout history. 46 is a reflection of the idea that every person, whether a member of a majority or a minority, has basic rights, including rights to participate in public life. Thus, the authority of a government, elected by a majority, to conduct for the time being the public affairs of the society is a consequence of the exercise of the rights of participation in public life of all citizens, whether they belong to the majority or minority. 49 This proposition finds support in the Guidance Note on Democracy issued by the UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon in 2009. 50 According to the Note: 'democracy is a universal value based on the freely expressed will of people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives.' 51 Examining the role that international law could play in guaranteeing a democratic decisionmaking process on GPGs raises the questions of a) the extent to which the international legal system itself is consistent with democratic values; and b) the extent to which international law allows public participation, ie participation of a broad range of actors, in decision-making at the international law level.
The (un)democratic features of international law
It is submitted that core features of the international legal system are undemocratic, or at least, able to function in an undemocratic way. First, it needs to be borne in mind that classic international law is neutral when it comes to the question of democracy in the context of recognition of States. In this context, emphasis is placed on the objective characteristics of Statehood as these are fleshed out in the 1933 Montevideo Convention 52 and the question of whether an entity putting forward a claim to Statehood is democratic is not considered. 53 However, since the end of the Cold War, the nature of a State's internal organisation as a criterion for the recognition of new States has made some headway and the relevant European practice is worth mentioning. In 1991 the (then) European Community adopted a set of Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. 54 The Guidelines recorded the determination of the Community's Member States to 'recognise, 49 Crawford (n 48) 114 (emphasis in the original). 50 disclosed by this record before me as to the de facto character of Tinoco's government, according to the standard set by international law. 60 It needs to be noted though that this position has not been followed consistently and that there are some instances where considerations of democratic legitimacy have been taken into account in the recognition of new governments. 61 However, as is the case concerning recognition of States, the fact that a government is not democratic does not imply that it will be refused recognition. 62 On the whole, relevant practice shows that in determining whether to recognise another government, States do not consider the non-democratic origin of the government as decisive. 63 International law has several other features that are in tension with democracy. There is the assumption that the executive of a particular State has plenary power to enter into international commitments -without any reference to the consent of the population of the State. 64 The relationship between international law and national legal systems may also be seen as undemocratic. From an international legal perspective, national law is not an excuse for failure to live up to international commitments -even if the former is democratically established. 65 Another undemocratic feature pertains to the almost unlimited power of the government to bind the State at the international level. International law views the authority of the government over the State as 'a continuing entity, no matter how undemocratic the Government.' 66 In the Tinoco arbitration, the claim that the undemocratic acquisition of power precluded a government from recognition was rejected and it was held that the successor government was bound by all acts of its predecessor irrespective of the latter's illegitimacy, on the grounds that it had retained effective control of the State. 67 The principle of non-intervention enshrined in art 2(7) of the UN Charter can also be viewed as potentially hostile to democracy. Art 2(7) which provides that 'nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State' illustrates the persistent focus of classic international law on the carapace of the State and not on its internal structure by shielding State sovereignty from foreign intervention -irrespective of how undemocratic the internal structure might be. 68 Scholarly attempts to pierce sovereignty's statist veil and to replace it with notions of 'popular sovereignty' (whereby true sovereignty is vested in the people of the State) 69 in order to buttress the argument that international law sanctions 'pro-democratic' interventions 70 fall short of convincing as they rest on slim evidentiary grounds. The US invasion in Panama, which was justified, inter alia, as an action in support of democracy, 71 was vociferously condemned by the UN General Assembly as 'a flagrant violation of international law and of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of States.' 72 As far as the Grenada invasion is concerned, the US did not invoke the restoration of democracy as a justification 73 and it was also condemned by the UN General Assembly. 74 Similarly, a unilateral right of pro- intervention to reinstate the legitimately elected President Aristide was based on a Security
Council resolution 78 adopted in response to an express request for UN action by the Aristide government -which had, thus, consented to the intervention. 79 In a similar vein, arguments in favour of pro-democratic intervention have a tenuous foundation in international judicial practice. In the Corfu Channel case, the British argument to the effect that the UK had a right to intervene in Albanian waters to remove mines was rejected because of the 'serious abuses' that such a right might give rise to. 80 In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ rejected the existence of a rule that allowed intervention 'by one State against another on the ground that the latter has opted for some particular ideology or political system.' 81 The above analysis shows that democracy is far from being an established element in the international legal order and that core features of international law remain undemocratic. However, when it comes to issues of participation, the State-centric nature of classic international law leaves much to be desired. While it is true that the ICJ's Advisory Opinion (namely the ability to possess rights and obligations) and the capacity to act (namely legal capacity, including procedural and law-making capacity) came to be severed from each other, 86 the latter still remains the prerogative of States and State-empowered bodies. 87 In LaGrand, Avena and Diallo the Court expressly acknowledged that non-State actors may have rights deriving directly from international law, while highlighting, at the same time, that the procedural capacity to pursue these rights remains with the State of nationality. 88 Furthermore, the Court has been, thus far at least, quite reluctant to acknowledge the law-making capacity of entities other than States -as evidenced by its rulings in the Anglo-Iranian Oil and Land and Maritime Boundary cases. 89 The reluctance towards conceding law-making capacity to entities other than States has not been affected by the proliferation of State contracts in the context of international investment law. 90 The reasoning of sole arbitrator Dupuy in Texaco/Calasiatic v Libya to the effect that 'a contract between a State and a private person falls within the international legal order' 91 has been fiercely criticised in the literature and not followed in practice. 92 93 Thus, according to mainstream legal thinking, although non-State actors have -to a certain extent -managed to carve out a legal space for themselves, States are still considered the predominant actors in international law and the gatekeepers of the international legal system. 94 Some positivists acknowledge that the changes on the ground of international practice call for a change in the way we conceptualise international law. 95 At the same time, according to this school of thought, the participation problem escapes the academic realm and can only be meaningfully solved if the key players of the system are willing to address it. As Zemanek stresses, States 'are the only ones that could initiate a modification of or an addition to the existing international law.' 96 The above analysis has shown that core tenets of international law are, at a minimum, able to function in an undemocratic way and that mainstream legal positivism is not well-suited to addressing the participation gap in the definition of GPGs.
Against this background, the remainder of the article will examine two alternative theoretical frameworks, which attempt to bridge the participation gap, namely global administrative law and global constitutionalism.
D. GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Accountability in international law, however described or perceived, is premised on the existence of a clear yardstick against which conduct can be tested. As Klabbers observes: "Classic international law has understood this very well: it is clear that State responsibility may only be incurred for … acts that amount to a violation of … an international legal obligation resting upon an actor." 97 The key point here is that, according to the traditional framework of international legal accountability, responsibility is related to a violation of the law by a recognised subject of the international legal system. As it has been noted above both what counts as 'law' and who counts as a 'subject' of international law are seen, in the global administrative law's strong commitment to inclusiveness would leave much room for disagreement about whose acts to count for the emergence of a new rule. 106 More fundamentally, global administrative law's primary focus on accountability means that the project lacks ambition when it comes to the question of broadening decisionmaking processes. Indeed, an early framing of global administrative law bracketed the question of democracy, in the sense of participation of affected groups in decision-making processes, as too ambitious an idea for global administration. 107 However, this bracketing seems normatively dubious to many. According to Krisch, an excessive focus on accountability implies losing sight of the need of public participation in rule-making. 108 It is noteworthy that constitutionalism has not been touted as a distinct legal theory. Rather, it has been put forward as a distinct doctrinal approach within the broader positivist camp -as an effort to construe international law in terms borrowed from domestic constitutionalism with a view to enhancing international law's legitimacy. 113 In this sense, instead of advocating a radical break with positivism, the constitutionalist argument in international law is of an essentially political nature; it is an argument in favour of the consolidation of democratic values such as the rule of law, democracy and the protection of human rights in international law. 114 As von Bogdandy stresses, adherents of global constitutionalism strive to attain the vision of a 'global legal community that frames and directs political power in light of common values and a common good.' 115 Global constitutionalism arose 'as a knee-jerk response to come to terms with the existential anxiety of fragmentation.' 116 Fragmentation, namely the splitting up of law into highly specialised regimes such as 'human rights law', 'trade law' and 'environmental law' that are relative autonomous from each other, as well as from general international law, carries the risk of the emergence of conflicting norms for the solution of the same legal issue. 117 Constitutionalism taps into modern worries regarding fragmentation by emphasising the existence of a normative hierarchy in international law. Proponents of constitutionalism view fundamental norms, like jus cogens and erga omnes obligations, as hierarchically superior 'constitutional' law 118 and for some the UN Charter is the constitution of the international community itself. 119 The project owes much of its appeal to the promise of unity, hierarchy, legitimacy and coherence that the very term 'constitution' implies. 120 For many, global constitutionalism holds greater promise for integrating participatory principles in the definition of GPGs. 121 According to Petersmann: As multilevel governance of interdependent international public goods has become the most challenging task in the twenty-first century -the current undersupply of international public goods requires embedding [international economic law] into stronger constitutional, cosmopolitan and democratically justifiable foundations. 122 Although proponents of global constitutionalism concede there is still much ground to cover, 123 it has been asserted that this intellectual framework offers two important insights on how international law could be conducive to filling the participation gap in the definition of GPGs.
Community interest
First, global constitutionalism promotes the 'concept of community interest'; the emergence of jus cogens norms, erga omnes obligations and the prevalence of Member States' obligations under the UN Charter over any other conflicting obligations in accordance with Art 103 UN Charter are all considered 'manifestations in positive international law of the concern for the protection of community interests, and implicitly, GPGs.' 124 It is argued that such principles of international law contribute to the vertical integration of the international legal order 'by recognising public goods which transcend state interests as global challenges '. 125 However, this proposition is not free of contradictions. First, it is not entirely clear how the promotion of the 'concept of community interest' is tangibly conducive to filling the participation gap in the definition of GPGs. Even if, arguendo, one accepts that, indeed, all the aforementioned principles of international law are manifestations of the international law concern for the protection of community interests, it is difficult to see how this concern could (in and of itself) help broaden decision-making processes pertaining to GPGs.
Furthermore, even if one merely accepts this proposition as empirical evidence in favour of constitutionalism, namely as evidence of a paradigm shift in international law from egotistical States to community interests in the form of GPGs, it is still difficult to identify with precision a common set of constitutional principles. 126 Apart from a widely agreed minimum including the prohibition of aggression, slavery and slave trade, genocide, racial discrimination apartheid and torture, as well as the basic rules of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict, and the right to self-determination, there is much disagreement regarding the exact scope of the concept of jus cogens norms. 127 Finally, the claim that jus cogens norms, erga omnes obligations and the effect of Art 103
of the UN Charter demonstrate that a normative hierarchy exists in international law is contested. Apprehending jus cogens as hierarchically superior 'constitutional' norms is deeply problematic as Kolb has pointed out. 128 According to him, jus cogens in international law functions in a similar way as in domestic law, namely 'as a legal technique whereby the unity of a legal regime is maintained ratione personae by denying the application of the rule lex specialis derogat generali in order to satisfy a collectively held interest in the equal application of a legal regime to all parties.' 129 In other words, jus cogens is a tool employed to keep a legal regime intact by giving precedence to certain general rules over special ones -in reversal of the ordinary lex specialis rule. In this sense, the concept is one pertaining to the relationship between general and more special rules, rather than one pertaining to questions of hierarchy. 130 Conceptualising jus cogens as a rule of hierarchy is problematic to the extent that the lex superior rule does not necessarily imply the nullity of the inferior rule; it merely means that the superior rule enjoys precedence. 131 This however cannot be reconciled with the 'voidnesslogic' of jus cogens. 132 Furthermore, the hierarchy argument is not convincing from the point of view of practice. Understanding jus cogens norms as hierarchically superior norms generates the expectation that they will always prevail over other norms of international law. 129 Kolb (n 128) 3. Thus, according to Kolb, the concept of jus cogens both in international law and in municipal law essentially serves the same function. As Kolb explains, in some cases, 'there is an interest, imposed by the legislator or ruled by tribunals, in keeping a legal regime entire and binding on all subjects by allowing no contracting out… These legal norms are thus said to be "non-derogable", that is, not replaceable by special legal regimes applicable as leges speciales between some parties. This is the proper domain of jus cogens.': ibid. However, as the ICJ found in the Jurisdictional Immunities case, even if certain human rights are considered jus cogens this does not mean that jurisdictional immunities do not apply any longer. 134 On this basis, the better view is to conceptualise jus cogens as a functional device to avoid the fragmentation of the international legal order through non-derogability rather than as hierarchically superior norms. 135 The constitutionalist claim that the concept of erga omnes obligations is a manifestation of the existence of a normative hierarchy in international law has also been belied. 136 According to the ILC Study Group on fragmentation of international law:
A norm which is creative of obligations erga omnes is owed to the 'international community as a whole' and all States -irrespective of their particular interest in the matter are entitled to invoke State responsibility in case of breach. The erga omnes nature of an obligation, however, indicates no clear superiority of that obligation over other obligations.
Although in practice norms recognised as having an erga omnes validity set up undoubtedly important obligations, this importance does not translate into hierarchical
Similarly it is difficult to see Art 103 of the UN Charter as establishing a system of hierarchy of norms. Art 103 can be explained as a conflict rule regulating the relationship between different treaty regimes -without having to have recourse to the concept of normative hierarchy. 138 The rule enshrined therein deals with a problem not infrequently encountered in practice: at a certain moment, a State may find itself bound by conflicting treaty obligations owed to different partners. 139 In this scenario, States are free to choose which obligation to perform, while at the same time accepting responsibility for non-performance towards the parties of the other agreement. Art 103 'pre-empts the choice' by giving precedence to obligations arising under the Charter. 140 The proposition that Art 103 of the UN Charter is a rule of precedence and not a manifestation of a normative hierarchy in international law is confirmed by the ILC which stated that the Article should be seen 'as a means for securing that Charter obligations can be performed effectively and not as abolishing other treaty regimes however incidental the conflict might be.' 141
The role of non-State actors
Secondly, it has been claimed that a further attribute of viewing the question of the definition of GPGs through the lens of global constitutionalism is the latter's approach to the question of non-State actors and their participation in international law-making. 142 More specifically, the argument is that Peters' version of global constitutionalism can be conducive to filling the participation-gap in the definition of GPGs to the extent that it advances a vision of the international community 'that is more constitutionalised and, therefore, more involved in the definition of GPGs.' 143 In order to assess the merits of this argument, a brief excursus into Peters' strand of global constitutionalism is called for.
Peters' version of constitutionalism stays close to mainstream legal thinking 144 when it comes to the question of actor informality. Thus, while Peters acknowledges that constitutionalist considerations dictate that the individual is the ultimate unit of legal concern, 145 she cautions against abolishing the distinction between legal subjects and social actors, that may indirectly influence international law-making processes but which are devoid of legal personality. 146 According to Peters, abolishing the dichotomy between formal and informal participation in the law-making process would undermine stability and predictability in international relations. 147 If all types of activities, such as lobbying and making policy statements, were considered as 'law' then the distinction between law and non-law would collapse, thereby undermining legal certainty -something that would run counter to constitutionalist aspirations. 148 On this basis, Peters concludes that 'it is, from a constitutionalist perspective, for reasons of legal clarity, preferable to insist on the formal distinction between those actors that vote and those that merely have a voice in international law-making.' 149 Peters buttresses her argument with reference to the legitimacy and accountability deficits of de facto influential actors such as NGOs. From a constitutionalist vantage point, acknowledging a law-creating role for NGOs would be potentially illegitimate, as they are not necessarily democratically organised: elections are infrequent within such bodies. 150 As Tomuschat stresses, since NGOs are the product of 'societal freedom, they lack the kind of legitimacy which a government emerging from free democratic elections may boast of.' 151 Furthermore, NGOs are not accountable to the people they are supposed to represent. 152 Although NGOs often make broad claims to represent certain groups of people, their 'beneficiaries' are not in a position to question their actions. 153 Thus, NGOs cannot be considered, from a constitutionalist perspective, as the true voice of the peoples they are allegedly representing. 154 At the same time, this strand of constitutionalism acknowledges that the indirect involvement of non-State actors in international law-making can enhance the legitimacy of global governance. 155 Despite their shortcomings, NGOs, as non-governmental entities, introduce an independent outlook into global affairs and they help put pressure on States to fulfil their international obligations. 156 NGOs have a well-documented history of identifying and lobbying for the increased protection of GPGs; the landmines campaign, debt relief, international certification of the diamond trade and access to medicine are good illustrations. 157 In this light, Peters advocates in favour of broadening, structuring and streamlining the role of NGOs in international law-making processes. 158 This can be done by formalising and harmonising the relevant selection and accreditation procedures and by rendering financial assistance and technical support to weaker civil society actors, in order to guarantee inclusiveness and broad participation. 159 It is difficult to see how the distinction between formal and informal participation brings anything new to the table. Indeed, traditional legal thinking is anything but unfamiliar with the conceptual distinction between direct and indirect participation in international law-making.
Even avowed positivists, such as Brownlie, have recognised that informal prescriptions issued by actors other than States may have a 'catalytic effect' in shaping the law. 160 More recently, the ILC's Special Rapporteur on the topic of identification of customary international law, Michael Wood, expressed a similar view. Wood opined that actors other than States and international organisations may play an indirect role in the formation of customary law insofar as their conduct may prompt or record State practice and the practice of international organisations. 161 NGOs have a well-documented history of involvement in treaty-making for over 200 years. 162 Non-State entities are also a catalyst for the formation of customary international law.
As Judge Van den Wyngaert stressed in her Dissenting Opinion in the Arrest Warrant Case:
he opinion of civil society … cannot be completely discounted in the formation of customary international law today.' 163 A classic example here is the contribution of the International Law Association to the crystallisation of the principle of equitable utilisation as a rule of customary law in the context of international water law. 164 The above examples illustrate that traditional international legal thinking has envisaged law-creation as a broad concept within which the normative significance of the stages preceding the threshold of legality can be captured. At the heart of this approach lies the recognition that while a number of actors may influence the formation of law, they cannot enter the formal law-making process in an unmediated fashion -thereby allowing us to straddle the abiding antimony between law and fact. 165 the same time, it seems that international law may have less to offer when it comes to the question of integrating democratic and participatory principles in the definition of GPGs.
Attempts to frame the question of the democratic definition of GPGs in legal terms that ignore the tension between democracy and the structure of the international legal system as well as the inadequacy of alternative legal frameworks to satisfactorily address the participation problem in global governance may be seen as symptomatic of the general unease felt by international lawyers to deal with questions of global governance without transferring them into the realm of law. As d'Aspremont aptly remarks: 'It is as if international legal scholars cannot study a phenomenon without portraying it as a legal phenomenon.' 167 However, the usefulness of framing all global policy challenges as challenges for international law is doubtful. Such an approach rests on the assumption that international law can bring about all the necessary political and social changes and thus, runs the risk of 'legocentrism' -where 'law is treated … as the natural path to the ideal … conflict resolution and ultimately to social order guaranteeing peace and harmony.' 168 However, international law is but one of the elements in the transposition of democratic standards (such as public participation in decisionmaking processes) in global governance. As Charlesworth notes, international law:
[I]s a strand in a fabric of regulation where the strength of each strand by itself is rather weak. The strength of the fabric as a whole … comes from the process of weaving multiple strands together … We can think of the democratic fabric as including economic, sociological, cultural, historical and legal threads. By themselves each set would have little impact, but woven together they make the fabric more resilient and more beautiful. 169 The foregoing analysis showed that, presently, the 'international legal thread' is not particularly strong. Thus, instead of shoehorning reality into theoretical frameworks that fall short of convincing, international legal scholars should be more open about the limits of our own discipline and concede that, at this moment in time at least, international law and international legal scholarship are (in and of themselves) of limited assistance when it comes to bridging the participation gap in the definition of GPGs.
This conclusion by no means implies that the debate regarding the democratisation process underlying the definition of GPGs should not continue. On the contrary, the debate is an acute reminder of the lingering legitimacy and participation issues in international law. 
